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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
unintentional and occurred occasionally and incidentally. Moreover,
only a few suffered by reason, of it. But here the inequalities are
not so limited for a great class of persons are harmed purposely
and pervasively, this fact being unqualifiedly true when the gift is
moderate in amount and goes to a husband and wife.
There is evident injustice, too, in the provision which would put
in force the taxing at a single rate the gift of an humble worker for
the support of his wife and child and the gift of a banker or mer-
chant prince to a distant relative or friend. The legislature that
would not permit such a system for its own citizens, now attempts
to place this burden upon non-residents.
While it may be proper for a state to forego taxes upon a
transfer by a non-resident of a particular state, so that a reciprocity
plan might be effectuated, any attempt to impose an excessive or
unequal rate in those instances where such reciprocity is 'lacking, is to
be strongly condemned.
The court, in ruling on the unconstitutionality of the statute, sub-
mitted the very persuasive conclusion that after all the principle of
equal treatment for the citizens of all the states is a good more
precious than the gain in revenue that may be incident to a high
tax rate on transfers by non-residents. 5
COURTS-CONTEMPT-CIRCULATION OF DEROGATORY PRINTED REPORT.
-An information charging contempt of court was filed against the
defendants herein, officers of the Anti-Saloon League who had at-
tacked the views and decisions of the Supreme Court of Indiana
with respect to the enforcement of prohibition laws. The attack was
in the form of a widely-circulated, printed report which contained
many belittling remarks, much caustic comment and a distinct false-
hood as to the disposition of a recent case before the Court. Appeals
were made for the election of a Judiciary that would be "dry" and
not "wet" and for one possessing such a sense of honor and loyalty
to the Constitution that it would render decisions carrying out both
its letter and spirit. Held, that the defendants, excepting one, were
guilty of contempt of court. State v. Shumaker, et al., 157 N. E. 769
(Sup. Ct. Ind. 1927).
Contempts of court are generally classified as civil and criminal,
under one classification, and as direct or constructive under another
classification.' A direct contempt of court may occur by reason of an
open insult to the person of the court, which is misconduct tending to
obstruct or to interfere with the proper administration of justice.2
A constructive contempt consists of an act which, although not done
in the presence of the court, is nevertheless of such character as to
belittle or degrade the court, or to obstruct, interrupt, prevent or
embarrass the proper administration of justice. 3 This case can be
'245 N. Y. 486, 496; 157 N. E. 753, 757
113 C. J.5.
'People v. Newburger, 98 App. Div. 92, 90 N. Y. Supp. 740 (1st
Dept., 1904).
'Saal v. South B'klyn R. R., 122 App. Div. 364, 106 N. Y. Supp. 996
(2nd Dept., 1907); Stuart v. Reynolds, 204 Fed. 709 (C. C. A. 5th,
1913).
RECENT DECISIONS
classified directly under the heading of constructive contempt of
court. An inherent power within the general jurisdiction of courts
is to punish those who have been guilty of a contempt of court.4
In the well-written opinion in the instant case, it is stated that
the report published, neither in its nature nor in its purpose, could
be deemed to fall within the confines of fair criticism. It is settled
that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech is not so broad
as to permit publications which are of such a nature as to interfere
with the due administration of justice.5 Furthermore, "the power of
the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people in its integrity and
intelligence. Take away this faith and the moral influence of the
courts is gone and the respect for the law is destroyed. * * * The one
element in government and society which the people desire above all
things else to keep from the taint of suspicion is the due adminis-
tration of justice in the courts." 6
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER IN FIRsT DEGREE-CONTEMPORANEOUS
FELONY. Again the Court of Appeals has had occasion to reverse a verdict
in a murder trial on the ground of an erroneous charge of the lower
court. At the trial of this case, controverted evidence was introduced
to show that the defendant, while riding in an automobile, was
ordered to stop by two policemen who suspected him of being guilty
of the commission of a crime; and that the defendant thereupon
shot first one, and then the other, officer. The trial court sent the
case to the jury with the single charge of murder in the first
degree.' This charge was based on the mistaken theory that the
defendant, in killing one policeman was committing the felony which
supplied the intent necessary to make out first degree murder in
the second killing. Held, judgment reversed and new trial granted.
People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).
It has long been the rule that where one, while engaged in the
commission of a felony, kills another, he is guilty of first degree
murder.2 However, it is in the application of this doctrine that
confusion has arisen. Before such theory ought to be relied on by
the prosecution, it should be able to show that the felony complained
of was not a part of the homicide and merged therein. It must show
that while the felony upon which it relies may be a part of the
homicide, yet, that the other elements thereof are so distinct from
that of the homicide, as not to be an ingredient thereof.3 Thus in
People v. Wagner,4 the defendant, while assaulting a woman, shot and
killed the deceased who had come to the aid of the assailed. The
conviction was affirmed, the court reiterating the rule: "The felony
that eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is independ-
4Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
'People v. News-Times Pub. Co., 35 Colo. 253, 205 U. S. 454 (1907);
State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
'In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 680, 76 S. E. 397, 404 (1912).
1N. Y. Penal Code, § 1044, Sub. 2.
'4 Black. Corn., §§ 178-201.
'People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912).
4245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
